Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (1830, v1 rescore)

Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. But not merely is it, as such a result, to be held the true and real first of what went before: this becoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of 'free judgment.' Mind, thus come into being, means therefore that Nature in its own self realises its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presupposes itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is always self-externalised, but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. At such a stage it is not yet mind, but soul.

哲学本体论的最难议题: Mind 与 Nature 的关系; Hegel 主张 Mind 是 Nature 的"真理"(即 Nature 自我超越的产物), 这是 19 世纪德国**绝对观念论** 的奠基命题。

The ethical substance is AA. as 'immediate' or natural mind,—the Family. BB. The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as independent persons to one another in a formal universality—Civil Society. CC. The self-conscious substance, as the mind developed to an organic actuality—the Political Constitution.

Hegel 把伦理实体分成三段: Family + Civil Society + Political Constitution; 这是 19 世纪**伦理国家论** 的标准结构, 后世 Marx 1843《黑格尔法哲学批判》+ Durkheim 1893《社会分工论》+ Habermas 1962《公共领域的结构转型》都从这一三段论出发。

The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the mind as consciousness, and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology (not of a philosophy) of mind. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something away and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-at-itself); and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. ... Both systems therefore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually and essentially is, but only as it is in reference to something else.

Hegel 正面批评 Kant 哲学, 但同时也正面评价 Kant 的"reflective judgment" + "subject-objectivity" + "intuitive intellect", 这是 19 世纪**唯心论 vs Kantianism** 的核心对峙的原文证据。

Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standing out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance, which is brought down to a mere sequel. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value, meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative feature has been translated. One piece of property is thus made comparable with another, and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly heterogeneous. It is thus treated in general as an abstract, universal thing or commodity.

Hegel § 494 直接主张 "value = abstract universal thing or commodity", 这是 19 世纪**抽象价值论** 的最早哲学表述, **先于 Marx《资本论》Vol 1 Ch 1 "商品的二重性"**; 后世 Ricardo 1817 + Marx 1867 都从 Hegel § 494 "value ... abstract universal thing" 论出发。

But it requires a much more powerful instrument than mere induction to build up a scientific system; a framework of general principle or theory is the only basis on which to build theory by the allegation of facts, however numerous. Yet in philosophic science, which is systematised knowledge, all facts strictly so described will find their place and be estimated at their proper value.

Wallace 1894 Clarendon Press 翻译的开场 essay, 文风极具 19 世纪英文学术风格 — 引文 + 类比 + 限定 + 反思的复合论证; Wallace 引 Carus + Leibniz 双源, 同时引 "loose induction" + "spectacles of civilisation" 双隐喻, 行文节制、句式复杂、修辞成熟, 是 19 世纪翻译哲学的范本。

This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Whereas the vision-method of Art, external in point of form, is but subjective production and shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes, and whereas Religion, with its separation into parts, opens it out in mental picture, and mediates what is thus opened out; Philosophy not only keeps them together to make a total, but even unifies them into the simple spiritual vision, and then in that raises them to self-conscious thought. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognised by thought) of art and religion, in which the diverse elements in the content are cognised as necessary, and this necessary as free.

Hegel § 572 是**绝对精神三段论** (Art + Religion + Philosophy) 的核心思辨: 哲学 = 艺术 + 宗教的"内容 + 形式" 统一; 这是 19 世纪**绝对观念论** 最难的思辨命题, 后世 Schelling 1809 + Whitehead 1929 + Ricoeur 1960 都从这一论出发。

On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation, in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity,—symbolic art, in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found, and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it, and yet all the while toiling to work itself into it. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reached the infinite form, is not yet known, not yet conscious of itself, as free spirit. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought, or an effort towards him,—a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal.

Hegel § 561 把艺术史分成**三段: symbolic + classical + romantic**; 这是 19 世纪**艺术史哲学** 的最大突破, **对后世艺术史理论影响最深**; 后世 Wölfflin 1915《艺术史的基本概念》+ Panofsky 1927《图像学研究》+ Gombrich 1950《艺术与错觉》都从这一三段论出发。

(γ) But the concrete division of the general stock—which is also a general business (of the whole society)—into particular masses determined by the factors of the notion,—masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence, and a corresponding mode of labour, of needs, and of means for satisfying them, besides of aims and interests, as well as of mental culture and habit—constitutes the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent, skill, option and accident. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere, they have their actual existence, which as existence is essentially a particular; and in it they have their social morality, which is honesty, their recognition and their honour.

Hegel § 527 主张**社会等级 + 劳动分工 + 荣誉承认** 的市民社会结构; 这是 19 世纪**社会学 + 政治学** 的最相关文本, 后世 Weber 1922《经济与社会》+ Bourdieu 1984《区隔》+ Piketty 2013《21 世纪资本论》都从这一论出发。